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Two primate social psychologies have developed in recent decades—one that focuses on the social 
behaviors of humans and the other on nonhuman primates. Despite the gains in knowledge in each 
field of social psychology, the two research traditions seem to be largely unaware of the other’s exis-
tence. Our common evolutionary ancestry makes this ignorance about the “other” social psychology 
especially troublesome for both fields. This article explores possible points of mutual interest that 
might lead to shared explanations of social behavior. In particular, I discuss how the topics of sexual 
behavior, cooperation and conflict resolution, and culture could benefit both social psychologies with 
respect to theory and methodology. 
 
One control group of neonatal monkeys was raised on a single wire mother, and a second control 
group was raised on a single cloth mother. There were no differences between these two groups in 
amount of milk ingested or in weight gain. The only difference between the two groups lay in the 
composition of the feces, the softer stools of the wire-mother infants suggesting psychosomatic in-
volvement. The wire mother is biologically adequate but psychologically inept…A charming lady 
once heard me describe these experiments and, when I subsequently talked to her, her face brightened 
with sudden insight: “Now I know what's wrong with me,” she said, “I'm just a wire mother.” Per-
haps she was lucky. She might have been a wire wife. (Harlow, 1958, p. 675) 
 
As a social psychologist who has studied human social behavior exclu-
sively in my career, I was naturally curious to learn a few years ago about an un-
dergraduate course titled "Primate Social Psychology," which was being offered at 
a university where I was employed. I obtained permission from the professor of 
that course, who is a primatologist, to attend his lectures. As the weeks progressed, 
I quickly discovered that I knew very little about the social psychology of nonhu-
man primates, but I was just as surprised to learn how little primatologists ap-
peared to know about the social psychology of humans. In fact, I have come to re-
alize that few scientists in the fields of human social psychology and primate social 
psychology are familiar with the other's body of knowledge. (For the sake of brev-
ity, I henceforth use "primate" in this paper to designate nonhuman primates.) Of 
course, an interest in comparative ties between human and primate social behavior, 
as evidenced by the above quotation from Harlow’s (1958) presidential address to 
the American Psychological Association, has existed for much of psychology's 
recent history. In this article, I would like to argue for a greater integration of these 
two very separate literatures. With an increase of knowledge about the "other" lit-
erature, we should be able to develop more shared explanations of primate social 
behavior that depend on both ultimate and proximate causes. Although many of the  
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examples in this article will emphasize the potentially rich contributions of the re-
search on the social behavior of primates to the field of human social psychology, 
which reflects a bias stemming from my own proclivities, the goal of developing a 
comprehensive social psychology should yield great rewards to both fields—a 
point about which I will elaborate later in this article. 
 
The Two Separate Social Psychologies of Today 
 
  Before discussing how the integration of these two fields might come 
about, I would like to demonstrate first how deep the gulf between these two social 
psychologies is. In human social psychology, the Handbook of Social Psychology 
has been published in nearly every decade over the past fifty years. This handbook 
provides a comprehensive, nearly definitive, review of the field. The latest edition 
(Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998) is nearly 2000 pages long (divided in two vol-
umes), and includes 37 chapters written by leading researchers on various topics of 
interests to social psychologists (e.g., small groups, social conflict, aggression, 
gender). Given the breadth of this handbook, I was surprised that I could find only 
two citations of research on primates. Therefore, my expectations were lowered 
when I next surveyed eleven current undergraduate social psychology textbooks. 
In these texts, ten did not mention any research on nonhuman primate social be-
havior, and the one exception focused on Harlow's pioneering work in the 1950s 
on emotional development (e.g., Harlow & Zimmerman, 1958). Finally, assuming 
that the rapidly growing interest in evolutionary social psychology would surely 
include consideration of the social behavior of our nearest evolutionary relatives, I 
examined recent major review articles on evolutionary social psychology (Buss, 
1996; Buss & Kenrick, 1998) and texts on evolutionary psychology written or ed-
ited by social psychologists (Buss, 1999; Simpson & Kenrick, 1997). Again, there 
was no mention of primates in the review articles, and hardly any mention of them 
in the books, with the notable exception of a chapter by Haslam (1997) on "Four 
Grammars for Primate Social Relations." 
 The gulf that divides human and primate social psychology is just as great 
when seen from the other side—primatology. For example, consider de Waal's 
(1982/1989) detailed account of chimpanzee social behavior, Chimpanzee Politics, 
which had the distinction that Newt Gingrich put it on the required reading list for 
new members of the U.S. Congress in 1995. Although highly praised and widely 
read, de Waal cites none of the literature on the social psychology of humans in 
over 100 references that appear in the bibliography. Similarly, Chadwick-Jones’s 
(1998) Developing a Social Psychology of Monkeys and Apes was advertised on 
the book jacket to be "…of particular interest to primatologists, ethologists, an-
thropologists, zoologists, social psychologists, and students of social cognition and 
social interaction." Despite these promising words, with the exception of a discus-
sion of some comparative literature on facial expressions, this book also largely 
ignores the human social psychology literature. 
 
Bringing the Two Social Psychologies Together 
 
 Given the extensive genetic relatedness between humans and other pri-
mates, it is troubling that the two social psychologies of today have so little to do 
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with one another. Researchers in both the human and primate social psychologies 
ought to benefit from developing, at least some shared explanations of (human and 
nonhuman) primate social behavior. Granted, there are researchers who are knowl-
edgeable about both the human and primate literatures pertaining to their research 
topic, but this comparative social psychological perspective is certainly not perva-
sive in human social psychology and is only rarely taught to researchers in either 
field, as evidenced by recent handbooks and reviews. Given that a more compre-
hensive social psychology has not yet developed in the past 50 years, it appears 
that such a synthesis of literatures will not happen without (a) more direct com-
parative work between humans and other primates, and (b) greater knowledge of 
the other social psychology's literature by each group of researchers. Several po-
tential points for developing shared explanations exist today, as listed in Table 1. 
Each of these topics has a considerable literature already developed within the two 
social psychologies. Space limitations prevent a full discussion of these topics 
here, but I spend the remainder of this paper briefly discussing three of them—
sexual behavior, cooperation and conflict resolution, and culture. 
 
        Table 1 
Potential Points for Developing Shared Explanations 
Sexual behavior—mate selection, functions of sex 
Deception 
Intragroup and intergroup processes 
Development of selfawareness 
Cooperation 
Bargaining 
Individualistic vs. collective "cultures" 
Psychological mechanisms that underlie culture 
Peacemaking and conflict resolution 
Aggression 
Facial expressions and emotion 
Empathy and altruism 
Social cognition 
Theory of mind 
 
Possible Point of Shared Explanations #1: Sexual Behavior 
 
 Within human social psychology, a great deal of attention has been given 
recently to sexual strategies theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1995), which attempts to ac-
count for sex differences in human mate selection. According to this theory, differ-
ences between men and women have evolved in the number of short-term sexual 
partners they seek. Men should devote a larger proportion of their total mating ef-
fort to short-term mating compared to women because, due to sexual selection, 
human males strive to increase their chances of offspring by passing their sperm to 
as many females as possible. In support of this hypothesis, Buss and Schmitt 
(1993) found in a survey of young adults a large difference between the number of 
sexual partners men desired (M = 16) and the number of sexual partners women 
desired (M = 4) in the next 30 years of their lives. It is interesting, therefore, to 
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consider how a primatologist might view this approach. For example, Dixson 
(1998), a primatologist studying sexual behavior, views humans, compared to 
other primates, as having a predominantly long-term mating system, which is ei-
ther monogamous or polygynous. When compared to other primates, the human 
male's relatively small testicle size and low sperm count, as well as humans' low 
white cell counts associated with low rates of sexually transmitted diseases, appear 
to be at odds with sexual strategies theory. As an anonymous reviewer noted, long-
term mating is relative. Humans have smaller testicles than chimpanzees, but lar-
ger testicles than gorillas, which do not exhibit predominantly long-term mating. In 
addition, Miller (2000) interpreted research demonstrating that men ejaculate more 
sperm in response to a partner's absence (Baker & Bellis, 1995) as evidence that 
humans are only moderately monogamous. 
 A group of social psychologists (Pedersen et al., 2002), recently reana-
lyzed the original Buss and Schmitt (1993) findings, but did so from a perspective 
that considered evidence drawn from samples of other primates (i.e., compared to 
other primates, humans are relatively monogamous and lack a short-term mating 
strategy). Using Buss and Schmitt’s data set, Pedersen et al. found no sex differ-
ences for desired partners when the medians were analyzed rather than the means, 
which in the case of the males were greatly affected by a few extreme outliers. In 
fact, the modal response for "ideal number of sex partners" was one for both men 
(48%) and women (67%). In a second sample of respondents similar to Buss and 
Schmitt's, only 1.1% of the males and 0.8% of the females reported that they did 
not intend to "settle down with" a mutually exclusive sexual partner. Thus, Buss 
and Schmitt's original hypothesis regarding sex differences in the desired number 
of sexual partners was at odds with the perspective coming from studies of primate 
sexual behavior, and the data in fact appear to favor the primatologist's approach.  
 The point here is not whether sexual strategies theory is right or wrong, but 
instead that it was originally proposed as a result of solid reasoning based on stud-
ies of human social behavior with apparently little consideration of other primates' 
sexual behaviors. As such, the theory's proponents may have considered relevant 
evidence incompletely while theorizing. In the realm of sexual behavior generally, 
this is an area that human social psychologists could potentially benefit a great deal 
by considering work in primate social psychology. For example, chimpanzees (and 
other primates) regularly use sex as a commodity for protection and/or coalition 
building and bonobos frequently exhibit homosexual behavior in their social rela-
tions (de Waal, 1989). In contrast, human social psychology is basically mute on 
both issues, despite a surge in interest in close relationships and sexuality by social 
psychologists in the past decade. Similarly, the primate literature might benefit 
from a consideration of some of the variables involved in human mate selection. 
Although male primates can vary in their physical appearance, little is known 
about the physical characteristics preferred by females, and more psychological 
variables such as personality and intelligence are typically ignored by primatolo-
gists when they consider other influences (besides status) on mate preference 
(Miller, 2000). 
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Possible Point of Shared Explanations #2:  
Cooperation and Conflict Resolution 
 
 Among nonhuman primates, social grooming is ubiquitous. For example, 
baboon and macaque species spend approximately 15-18% of their day grooming 
others (Dunbar, 1993). Social grooming is believed by many primatologists to be 
an important component of affiliation (Cords, 1993). Recently, investigations of 
primate social behavior have focused on whether grooming behavior can also serve 
as a commodity—something that can be traded with another for other social pur-
poses. Chimpanzees, in particular, seem to be particularly good at keeping track of 
whom they have received grooming from, not only in recent hours but across days 
(de Waal, 1992). Grooming another may mean that the other will be more likely to 
intervene during a fight (de Waal & Luttrell, 1988). Keeping track of such recipro-
cal relationships over an extended period of time requires advanced cognitive abili-
ties, which is perhaps why chimpanzees are unique among the nonhuman primates 
in this respect (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Haslam, 1997).  
Of course, when faced with similar social situations, humans typically fol-
low a norm of reciprocity—a moral code that (a) we should help those who have 
helped us, and (b) those whom we have helped are expected to help us (Gouldner, 
1960). This norm perhaps reflects an evolved “reciprocal altruism,” according to 
Trivers (1971). Research on reciprocal altruism in humans is perhaps best exempli-
fied by Axelrod’s (1984) work on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in which two 
people participate across several turns in a fictional scenario where they can 
choose whether or not to implicate their partner in a crime. As a result of testing 
several possible winning strategies with computer modeling, Axelrod determined 
that the best strategy, dubbed Tit-for-Tat, was also one of the simplest: Cooperate 
with the partner the first time and then, on the next turn, do the same thing the 
partner did on the last turn. Although no study of the Tit-for-Tat strategy with non-
human primates has been reported, it is remarkably similar to the reciprocation 
observed in some species. As Haslam (1997, p. 305) noted, “de Waal (1991) went 
so far as to ascribe prescriptive rules to chimpanzees, corresponding to rudimen-
tary justice or fairness norms, thereby significantly narrowing the gap between 
human and primate implementations of reciprocity.”  
Among humans, instances of reciprocity, whether immediate or delayed 
for many years, are pervasive. In some societies, for example, it is considered to be 
beneficial to raise several children so that they can in turn help their parents in old 
age. Social dilemmas arise, however, when the needs of individuals begin to con-
flict with the need of the society as a whole (e.g., if everyone has many children, 
there will soon not be enough food to go around). When given such social dilem-
mas, people often "rationally" behave towards a doomed outcome (Kelley & Thi-
baut, 1978; Komorita & Parks, 1994; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Rapoport & Cham-
mah, 1965). For example, in one study (Edney, 1979) a group of students were 
seated around a bowl of ten metal nuts and were told that they should each accu-
mulate as many nuts as possible. The students were also told, however, that every 
ten seconds the number of nuts remaining in the bowl would be doubled. Of 
course, the optimal strategy would be for each participant to wait a long time be-
fore taking a nut, but, in fact, 65% of the groups in this study never reached the 
first ten-second replenishment. Similar sorts of behavior have no doubt led to 
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many of the problems humans face today, such as freshwater shortages, pollution, 
destruction of forests, and overfishing. Explanations for what seems to be a 
uniquely human activity include social psychological concepts such as the funda-
mental attribution error (i.e., people tend to underestimate the power of the situa-
tion when explaining and predicting others’ behaviors) and diffusion of responsi-
bility (i.e., in large groups people are more likely to think that others, rather than 
themselves, are responsible dealing with the problem). Again, it is interesting to 
note that such explanations rely on advanced cognitive skills, and thus may explain 
why humans may be unique among the primates in their proclivity to destroy 
themselves (Diamond, 2003).  
 Finally, given the extent of the conflict that frequently occurs between in-
dividuals and between social groups, human social psychology has had much to 
say about techniques that are likely to lead to conflict resolution. For example, 
based on an analysis of international conflicts, Osgood (1962) proposed a strategy 
to deescalate international tensions called graduated and reciprocated initiatives in 
tension-reduction, or GRIT. GRIT involves a series of steps that consist of con-
ciliatory acts that one side makes so as to induce the other side to reciprocate. It 
was formulated by Osgood as a plan to reverse the arms race, and some support, 
from both in the laboratory and at the international level, has been found for parts 
of it. Other social psychologists (e.g., Kelman & Cohen, 1976) have emphasized 
the role of third-party mediation in conflict resolution, and again have developed 
strategies for resolving conflicts. Therefore, it is interesting that social psycholo-
gists generally do not focus on naturalistic conflict resolution. That is, they do not 
tend to describe how humans naturally resolve their disputes, but instead derive 
logical solutions to conflict resolution that then need to be taught to the parties in-
volved. 
 In contrast, in the nonhuman primate literature, several studies have been 
conducted on how apes and monkeys naturally resolve conflicts (cf. Aureli & de 
Waal, 2000b). For example, chimpanzees will kiss and embrace after fights (de 
Waal, 1989) and specific gestural, tactile, and vocal signals used in reconciliation 
have been identified in baboons (Cheney, Seyfarth, & Silk, 1995). Chimpanzees 
have been also observed consoling losers, which is often performed by third-party 
chimpanzees (de Waal & van Roosmalen, 1979); consoling losers has been re-
ported for gorillas as well (Watts, 1995), but not for macaques. Chadwick-Jones 
(1998) has noted that because consolation appears to exist only in apes (and hu-
mans), it may reflect emotional and cognitive abilities found in apes but not mon-
keys. Again, the main point here is to contrast the work of primatologists, who de-
scribe the natural ways primates reconcile their conflicts, with the work of social 
psychologists, who prescribe ways that humans ought to reconcile their conflicts. 
A synthesis of these two literatures would be fruitful for both fields, and is already 
moving in that direction with the publication of an edited volume on naturalistic 
conflict resolution (Aureli & de Waal, 2000a), which includes chapters about both 
human and animal research on conflict resolution. 
 
Possible Point of Shared Explanations #3: "Culture" 
 
 Consider the differences between two macaques species—the rhesus and 
the stumptail. In captivity studies, both macaques organize themselves along 
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dominance hierarchies that are typically matrilineal. Differences between the 
rhesus and the stumptail appear in the relationships between individual monkeys. 
Among rhesus monkeys, the hierarchy is emphasized in all relationships with its 
associated privileges (e.g., escape of harassment by higher ranking members). The 
individual rhesus monkey’s goal is to move up the hierarchy, and once there, to 
stay on top. In contrast, stumptails appear to emphasize group cohesion. All mem-
bers will get involved in the reconciliation process between two conflicting mon-
keys. The individual stumptail monkey’s goal is to get along with others by avoid-
ing conflicts. 
 The differences between rhesus and stumptail “cultures” are similar to the 
differences that social psychologists have noted between individualistic versus col-
lectivistic (or interdependent) cultures (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In indi-
vidualistic cultures, exemplified by several North American and European coun-
tries, individuals are typically expected to have the goal of moving up the social 
ladder on their own accord. Self is defined by accomplishments achieved as an 
individual. In collectivistic cultures, exemplified by many Asian countries, indi-
viduals are typically expected to work for the common good. Individuals define 
themselves based on their relationships to others and their organizations. Again, 
interesting parallels between human and nonhuman primate social behavior exist, 
yet explicit comparative ties with respect to culture have rarely been made. 
 In fact, it is illuminating to consider the differences in how the very defini-
tion of “culture” is discussed (or not) by human social psychologists and prima-
tological counterparts. It may surprise primatologists to learn that “culture” is 
taken for granted by social psychologists. That is, as already noted, there has been 
a growing interest by social psychologists in cross-cultural comparisons. The evo-
lutionary processes involved in the formation of culture, however, are rarely dis-
cussed, as is what it is that exactly constitutes a culture. These vague assumptions 
can lead to the problem of where one culture ends and another begins when mak-
ing cross-cultural comparisons. For example, Russell (1994) has noted the difficul-
ties in interpreting support of the hypothesis that humans universally recognize a 
set of basic facial expressions. He argued that most of the “cross-cultural” studies 
conducted on this problem have employed university students and others as sub-
jects who, despite the residence of their continent, have had extensive contact with 
western cultures via the mass media. The question arises then whether unique cul-
tures still exist in this modern world, or, put another way, what is “culture” any-
way?  
Many social psychologists would be surprised to learn that this last ques-
tion has received a great deal of attention by primatologists, who have been en-
gaged in a debate for several years about whether humans uniquely have culture. 
Examples of apparent cultural transmission among primates include tool use by 
chimpanzees who use twigs to get termites or stones in nut cracking (Inoue-
Nakamura & Matsuzawa,1997; Whiten et al., 1999), orangutans building sun cov-
ers for nests or, during rain, bunk nests above the nests used for resting (van 
Schaik et al., 2003), potato washing by Japanese macaques (Kawai, Watanabe, & 
Mori, 1991) , and the propagation of handclasp grooming by chimpanzees (de 
Waal & Seres, 1997). Each of these examples involved isolated groups that devel-
oped a unique pattern of behavior that was transmitted to all members of the group, 
including their descendants. But do these behavioral patterns constitute a culture? 
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McGrew (2001), among others, has argued that this is evidence of culture if one 
considers criteria such as innovation (a new pattern of behavior is invented or 
modified), dissemination (the pattern is acquired by others in the group), durability 
(the pattern is performed when the demonstrator is gone), and tradition (the pattern 
persists from one generation to another). On the other hand, Tomasello (2000), 
who is a comparative psychologist, has argued that the formation of culture is per-
haps uniquely human. Arguing that much of the evidence cited in favor of cultural 
transmission in chimpanzees may be better described as examples of learning (for 
a review, see Tomasello, 1994), he posits that humans’ ability to recognize the in-
tentions of others is the key ingredient to “culture,” and much of human cognition 
comes from what we learn from our culture. It is interesting that he also gently 
chides cultural and social psychologists for not paying more attention to the cogni-
tive abilities that allow humans to create culture. As I have already stated, such 
discussions about what culture is, whether humans uniquely have it, and what are 
the underlying psychological mechanisms that enable it are topics rarely, if ever, 
considered by social psychologists, but generate a great deal of discussion among 
primatologists and comparative psychologists. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 In this paper I have only briefly sketched out three areas of possible mu-
tual interest to those who study the social behavior of humans and nonhuman pri-
mates. These are just a few examples of points where shared explanations might be 
developed that could benefit either field. I do believe that developing shared ex-
planations for primate social behavior is possible. Already, some primatologists 
have begun to recognize that the wall that separates the two social psychologies 
can be breached, as evidenced by a recent edited volume on how primate social 
behavior might inform research on the evolution of human social behavior (de 
Waal, 2001). Such a synthesis should begin by gaining knowledge about what the 
other side has already learned. Not every social psychologist is going to be fortu-
nate enough to be able to sit in on a lecture by a primatologist and vice versa, but 
there are several texts and articles that might constitute a common reading list for 
both fields. 
 Developing shared explanations of primate social behavior will be theo-
retically and methodologically fruitful for researchers in both the human and non-
human primate camps. Theoretical models based on evolutionary models lend 
themselves particularly well to being tested across human and nonhuman species. 
Why would humans have developed so many analogous social behaviors, yet have 
completely different underlying mechanisms and functions? Social psychologists 
studying humans have not really considered this question. Further, as noted in this 
article, there undoubtedly will be certain social behaviors that apes but not mon-
keys can emit, and an understanding of the differing emotional and cognitive abili-
ties that underlie differences in social behaviors should be especially informative. 
Methodologically speaking, social psychologists probably do not do enough ob-
serving of naturalistic behaviors, whereas primatologists have often shied away 
from experimentation in favor of naturalistic settings. Awareness of, and inclusion 
of, some of the methods that the other field of primate social psychology employs 
should again benefit both groups of researchers. I envision a comprehensive pri-
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mate social psychology university course being offered in the not-so-distant future, 
which would be cotaught by researchers of humans and nonhuman primates. When 
completing that course, a student would have a much better idea of not only what it 
is that we share with our evolutionary relatives, but also what it is that makes so-
cial behavior unique to each primate species.  
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